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LEIBNIZ AND RALPH CUDWORTH ON FRBE:DOM. 
NECESSITY AND FAT.ALJSM 
Didier Njirayamanda Kaphagawani 
Cudworth and Lei1miz 
Cudworth (1617-1688), a Cambridge Platonist, might 
be regarded as having had a ra~cally different philosophical 
stance from that of Leibniz (1646-1716). For he was branded 
by his contemporaries, particularly John Turner, as a 
Socinian.l And that he had nothing in common with Leibaiz 
would seem to be proved by the fact that Leibniz vehemently 
opposed Socinianism in general. He considered it a position 
which tended to nexaggerate the idea of freedomn.2 
Now, the question arises what Socinianism is. It was 
an evangelical, nationalistic movement which went through 
three, distinct phases. In the first phase, the thoughts of 
both Laelius Socinus (1525-1562) and bis nephew Faustus 
Socinus (1534-1604) were predominant. The second p~ 
was dominated by the principles upon which the Reformed 
Church of Poland was founded. And lastly, socinianism 
was very much influenced by the rational theology of the 
Socinised Minor Church in the Netherlands.3 
Socinianism was an admixture of tbe humanism as 
propounded by Juan de Valdes, th~ Platonism which flourished 
in Florence, and the Aristotelianism which had a large 
following in Padua. It was based on four things: a rationalistic 
and dogmatic reading of the scriptures; perceiving Christ 
as simply a man chosen by God to provide prophecies to 
· the world; a belief in peaceful and independent coexistence 
of the State and the Church; and the conviction that both 
the body and the soul die, but that those who adhere to God's 
word would rise again.4 This conception of salvation was 
central to Socinians. According to them, 
God's dominion comprises a right and supreme 
authority to determine whatsoever he may 
choose ••• in respect to us and to all other 
things, and also to those matters which no 
other authority can reach, such as are our 
thoughts though c_oncealed in the inmost recesses 
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of our hearts - for which he can at pleasure 
ordain laws, and appoint re.ward and 
punishment.5 
All Sodnians d~nied divine foreknowledge of contingent 
futurities because they believed that foreknowledge was 
incompatible with contingency and freedom. Convinced 
of the incompatibility of these notions, Christopher Stegman, 
a Sodnian contemporaneous with Leibniz, even went to 
the extent of maintaining that God exists in time. In s'o 
doing, he bridged the yawning gap between the creator and 
creatures; for God would be as exposed to the vicissitudes 
of living through time as all his creatures. However, Leibniz 
considered Stegmann's crude anthropomorphism as rep~ant 
and ridiculous, and hence unleashed swingeing criticisms. 
But, although Leibniz's derision of Socinianism is quite 
obvious, it must not be assumed that Tunler's reading of 
Cudworth was cOITect. For Cudworth was harshly criticised 
by theologians upon the publication of the first volume of 
his The T1'Ue Intellectual System of the Universe. This volume 
earned him so much disrepute that Cudworth never got round 
to completing the remaining two volumes. As Warburton 
reports, 
the much injured author grew disgusted, his 
ardour slackened; and the rest and far greater 
defence never appeared. 7 
This negative reception explains Tunler's misconception 
of Cudworth as a Soclnian. True, Socinianism spread to 
England before the Minor Church was stumped out in the 
Netherlands in 1658. But Cudworth, however, does not feature 
as one of those scholars who got converted to Socinianism. 
Among the. Cambridge Platonists, Benjamin Wichcote is 
the only philosopher who features on the list of Socinians 
in England. 8 
Nevertheless, Cudworth was, as Birch points out, "a 
man of very extensive learning, extensively skilled in the 
learned languages and antiquity, a good mathematician, 
a subtile philosopher, and a profound metaphysician". 9 Thus 
the depth and sagacity of his metaphysics and philosophy 
in general might, to some extent, be responsible for the 
unpopularity of Cudworth. 
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Now, this paper is an attempt to show. tl:iat despite 
fundamental differences. in their philosophy, Cudworth ..!emi · 
to have anticipated Leibniz in bis criticisms of 'Hobbes' an4 
the Reformer's necessitarianism, and of the Molinistic 
conception of freedom as indifference of equip Oise. 'But· · 
with regard to divine freedom, Cudworth seems to slip back. 
into Molinism. And that seems to confirm the thesis tlUlt · 
Cud worth's philosophy is a fusion of two tendencies,· :g.;unely, 
the critical and the dogmatic. These tendencies nm parali~ 
at times, but at other times they are j,nterlaced. Thus the 
intertwining of these tendencies seems also to · provide an 
explanation of why Cudworth was easy to misunderst~ 
As GysilO has observed, Cudworth's philosophy is nundµiy: 
difficult of accessn. · 
And again, Cudworth shares a common ground with Leibniz 
on the problem of freedom and necessity; they both considered 
it as of crucial importance, and worth examj,ning. · · Jndeed 
this problem was, for Leibniz, one of the "two famou. · 
labyrinths where our reason very often goes a.Strayn.Il T~ 
Cudworth, it was one of the principal subjects for tho~~ 
throughout his philosophic life. In fact, had the second •oluD,e". 
of The True Intellectual System of the Ulliftl"lle been ·writtei'.. 
it would have concemed itself with 
proving that God is not mere arbitrary Will 
omnipotent (without any essential goodness 
and justice), decreeing and doing things in 
the world, as well good as eviLlZ · 
The third volume would ·have exclusively focussed on 
establishing 
that necessity is not intrinsical to the true 
nature of everything, God and creatures, or 
essential to all action; but, that there is ••• 
(a sui potestu) ••• , that we have some liberty 
or power over our own actions.13 
According to Cudworth, the publication of the remaining. 
two volumes would liave marked the completion of the whole 
Intellectual System.14 But for reasons discussed earlier; 
that was never accomplished. 
However, Cud worth's original intention of setting himself 
the task of writing this book is quite evident. He intended 
it to be 
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a discourse concernming liberty and necessity ••• 
to speak out more plainly, against the fatal 
necessity of all actions and events.IS 
That he would have fulfilled his intentions, had the first 
volume had a warm reception, is highly suspect in view of 
what he says in the preface. He seems to have foreseen 
the unfavourable reception of his philosophical views. For 
he writes: 
••• we think fit here to advertise the reader 
concerning these (intentions), that though 
they were, and still are, really intended by 
us; yet the complete finishing and publication 
of them all will notwithstanding depend upon 
many contingencies; not only of our life and 
health, the latter of which, as well as the 
former, is to us very uncertain; but also of 
our leisure, or vacancy from other necessary 
employments.16 
However, Cudworth's views on the problem of freedom and 
necessity are expressed in his A Treaties of Freewill. This 
work seems to have been written around the 1650s,17 but 
was edited by John Allen and published in 1839. 
Now, the question is whether or not Leibniz was aware 
of this work of Cudworth. To attempt to answer this question 
is not at all to intend to spark off priority disputes, but 
rather to merely show that Cudworth and Leibniz shared 
a common ground with regard to Hobbes' necessitarianism 
and Molina's conception of freedom. To answer the question: 
judging from Leibniz's works, he was unwa:re of Cudworth's 
treatise on freedom. Leibniz acknowledges reading Cudworth's 
The True Intellectual System of the Universe. In fact, he 
obtained a copy of this book from Cudworth's daughter, 
Lady Masham, in Decem,ber 1703.18 And Leibniz even 
published a paper on Cudworth's doctrine of plastic natures.19 
This is a doctrine Cudworth introduced in his metaphysics 
to get round the Cartesian problem of interaction between 
corporeal and incorporeal substances. However, no mention 
is made in Leibniz of Cud worth's A Treatise of Freewill. 
In this work, both Hobbes' necessitarianism and the Molinistic 
conception of freedom are criticised, and muddles arising 
from considerations of divine foreknowledge of contingent 
futurities are somewhat clarified. 
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But one point is indisputable: Cudworth wrote earlier 
than Leibniz. He had his ideas crystallised by the very early 
1650s when Leibniz was less than ten ye~ of age. And 
as suggested by Allen,20 the work on freewill was written 
in reaction to Hobbes' A Treatise CJD LtDerty and Necemity 
which was published in 1654, and which Leibniz hjl,J!self 
wrote against in his 'Reflexions on the Work that Mr. Hobbes 
Published on Freedom, Necessity and Chance'. This was 
published in the Memories de Trevoux in 171 Z, twenty four 
years after Cudworth's death. Cudworth's work is, 
nevertheless, invaluable in that it provides U$ with arguments 
of a philosopher whose views on freedom and necessity very 
much resemble those of Leibniz, despite fundamental 
differences in their metaphysics. 
Hobbes' and Stoic Necessita:rianism 
It is important to point out that Cudworth's attitude 
to Hobbes' necessitarianism differs somewhat from that 
of Leibniz. Cud worth considered Hobbes' work as "the most 
egregious piece of ridiculous nonsense that was never 
written",21 as the epitome of the "most shameful ignorance 
in logic, especially for one who pretends so much to 
geometrical demonstration".22 Leibniz, however, is less 
abusive in his language. He says that he found Hobbes' views 
merely as "strange and indefensible" .23 As to why Leibniz 
is quite sympathetic and less harsh to Hobb.es is due to the 
fact that he does not regard Hobbe& as an absolute 
necessitarian. It is only that Hobbes is muddled on some 
fundamental terms.24 Cudworth, as is to be sl:)own in this 
paper, in fact charges Hobbes with this same confusion 
Cudworth's arguments against necessi.tarianism on the 
one hand, and for freedom on the other, are based on a 
posteriori grounds. That human beings are free, not passive 
in their actions, nor compelled by necessity is proved, 
according to Cudworth, by the fact that 
we praise and dispraise, commend and blame 
men for their actings, much otherwise than 
we do inanimate beings and brute animals.25 
When scorn is poured on a man who bas committed a wicked 
actfon, he is blamed 
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not only as doing otherwise than ought to have 
been done, but also t~an he might have done, 
and that it was possible for him to have avoided 
it, so that he was himself the cause of the 
evil thereof.2.6 
Cudworth defends freedom not only from the observation 
that men blame, punish or commend and reward other men, 
but also from the fact that individuals blame, curse and 
condemn themselves: 
men have an inward sense of guilt (besides 
shame), remorse of conscience, with hon-or, 
confusion, and astonishment; and they repent 
of those their actions afterwards with a kind 
of self-detestation.2.7 
Cudworth regards freedom as established by these two 
considerations. Indeed, he goes on to point out that 
if all human actions were necessary, men would 
be said no more to repent of them than of 
diseases, of that they were not born prii:ices, 
or heirs to a thousand pounds a year.2.8 
Then he concludes that 
there is something ••• m our power, and that 
absolute necessity does not reign over all human 
action, but that there is something of contingent 
liberty in them.2.9 
It is important to note that these a posteriori grounds 
employed by Cudworth are also ve~ much in use in modem 
philosophers' arguments for freedom. 0 
Having established the case for freedom, Cudworth then 
considers the arguments of necessitarians. At this point 
we should note that Hobbes maintains not only that 
contingency is unintelligible because it is impossible for 
it to exist in nature, but also that even if it were to exist, 
it would have been a preserve of God. The reasons for denying 
contingency are: that in the universe there is nothing which 
moves itself - (quicquid movetur movetur ab alio); that even 
if there were to be such a self determining or self-moving 
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being, it is impossible for a being to simultaneously be. a 
subject and an object of an action; that since every sufficient 
cause is a necessary cause, nothing comes into being without 
a cause; and that since the good determines the will, and 
also given that the criteria for the good are comprehended 
by the intellect, then volitions are necessary, and not free.31 
Cudworth also considers Stoical necessitarianism. The 
Stoics propounded their necessitarianism by arguing that 
there exist an infinite number of worlds, coming into existence 
and ceasing to be serially, and each one of which being e.xactly 
like any other. For example, if the life span of each world 
were an eon, then the world in the nth eon would be exactly 
like the world in the (n+l)th eon which in turn would resemble 
the world in the (n +z)th eon and so on. In these worlds, 
according to the Stoics, every being that existed in the 
preceding world would also exist in the new world. In any 
successive. world exist another Thales, another Socrates, 
another Leibniz, another Russell and 
another everything, and another every person, 
exactly the same, wearing all the same clothes, 
dwelling all in the same or like houses, sitting 
upon the same stools, making all the same 
motions, writing all the same books, speaking 
all the same words, and doing all the same 
actions over again.32 . 
Assumed in the arguments of the Stoics is that wof"lds 
come into being and cease to be in a serial order; but the 
same conclusion of absolute necessity could still be anived 
at even when the worlds are thought to exist concurrently, 
as noted by Cudworth.33 Nevertheless in both cases the 
question has to be faced: what guarantees trans-world identity 
of the individuals, or in what would lie the difference between 
one world and another if everything else is held to be the 
same? Although this problem has achieved prominence 
in modern philosophy,34 it did not cross Cudworth's mind, 
let alone the Stoics themselves. But the Stoical position 
is notoriously necessitarian; for the essence of Stoidsm 
is, inter alia, the outright ndenial of the freedom of the 
will".35 
Ralph Cudworth, however, regarded the Stoical position 
as fatalistic. In The True Intellectual System of the UniTene 
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he distinguishes three types of fatalism: naturalistic or Demo-
critical fate, Stoical fate, and theological fate. On these 
Cudworth writes: 
Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human 
actions and events, may be reduced to these 
three heads: First, such as asserting the Deity, 
sUppose it ir,respectively to decree and determine 
all things, and thereby make all actions 
necessary to us; which kind of fate, tho.ugh 
philosophers and their ancient writers have 
not been altogether silent of it, yet it has 
been principally maintained by some neoteric 
Christians, contrary to the sense of the ancient 
Church. Secondly, such as suppose a Deity, 
that acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive 
the general frame of things in the world; from 
whence by a series of causes doth. un~voidably 
result whatsoe'lrer is now done in it. Which 
fate is a concatenation of causes, all in 
themselves necessary, and is that which was 
asserted by the ancient Stoics Zeno and 
Cbrysippus.... And lastly, such as hold the 
material necessity of all things without a Deity; 
which fate Epicurus calls... 'the fate of the 
Naturalist', that is, ind~ed. the Atheists, the 
assert ors whereof may be called also the 
Democritical Fatalists.3° 
According to Cudworth the ground for necessitarians is 
twofold. On the one hand are those who maintain that "neces-
sity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that 
contingent liberty is ... a thing impossible or contradictous, 
which can have no existence anywhere in nature".37 And 
on the other front are those who "admit contingent liberty 
not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually 
existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be 
so determined by the will and the decrees of this Deity, 
as that they are made necessary to us11.38 
And the necessi tarians w po deny the existence of 
contingency defend their position, in Cudworth's view, from 
two different perspectives: 
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either from such a hypothesis as this: that 
the universe is nothing else but local mption; 
and nothing moving itself, the action of every 
agent is determined by some other agent without 
it; and therefore that ••• material and mechanical 
necessity must needs reign over all things; 
or else, though cogitative beings be supposed 
to have a certain principle of activity within 
themselves, yet that there can be no contingency 
in their actions, because all volitions are 
determined by a necessary antecedent 
understanding.3 9 
These are the philosophers who argue that contingency and 
liberty are impossible and unintelligible since it is impossible, 
according to them, for a being to be simultaneously an agent 
and a patient of an action. To these Cudworth retorts: 
We are certain by inward sense that we can 
reflect upon ourselves and consider ourselves, 
which is a reduplication of life in a higher 
degree; for all cogitative beings such as are 
self-conscious... when they judge their own 
actions... and condemn or acquit themselves. 
Wherefore that which is conscious of itself, 
and reflexive upon itself, may also act upon 
itself.40 
Insofar as a self-conscious being determines itself and effects 
a change in itself in one way or another, Cudworth concludes 
that a being of that sort is both an agent and a patient of 
an action. It is an agent when the being deliberates a change, 
and a patient when that change is put into effect. But then 
in that case, the being is not, strictly speaking, simultaneously 
an agent and a patient of an action; for being an agent of 
an action is temporally, if not logically, prior to being a 
patient of that same action. The unity is, presumably, 
maintained in that one and the same being executes and 
then suffers the action. 
Cudworth refutes the argument of Hobbes, that whatever 
happens does so by absolute necessity, by pointing out that 
if that were the case, then speculative and deliberative 
thought would be always necessary in conscious beings. Not 
only that, the following absurdity follows: 
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We could never divest our own thoughts, nor 
stop the inundation of them flowing in a stream 
from objects, nor entertain !lllY constant· design 
of life, nor can-y any project for the future.41 
Cudworth also notices a confusion in Hobbes, particularly 
on his conception of what .it is for a cause to be sufficient. 
In noticing this confunion Cudworth makes much the same 
observation as Leibniz. On causes he argues that 
there are two kinds of sufficient causes, one 
is such as acteth necessarily· and can neither 
suspend, nor determine its own action, another 
such as acteth contingently or arbitrarily, 
and bath a power over its own action, either 
to suspend it or determine it as it pleasetb.42 
Here Cudworth is making a distinction between, in Leibnizian 
terms, physical necessity and moral necessity; for the latter 
obtains only in rational agents. 
That Cudworth anticipates Leibniz's distinction is 
supported all the more by the criticisms Cudworth levels 
against the Socinians who argued that divine foreknowledge 
and contingency of future events and actions are incompatible 
notions. In the view of the Socinians, prescience implies 
necessity. In refuting this position Cudworth argues as 
follows: 
if the p,rescience be true, they must b.e 
foreknown to be contingents, and therefore 
to come to pass not necessarily, but contingently 
- moreover, they do not come to pass because 
they are foreknown but they are fcrelmown 
because they will come to pass (my emphasis), 
the certain prescience is not the cause of· 
their future coming to pass, but their future 
coming to pass is the cause of their being 
foreknown. There is no more necessity arising 
from prescience, than there would have been 
from their futurity, had they not been 
foreknown... Here is no necessity but ez 
hypothesl or hypothetical; upon supposition 
that it will be, it is necessarily future, but 
there is no absolute necessity in the thing 
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itself. When a contingent thing hath been, 
and is now past, it is then necessary that. it 
should have been; or it could not possibly not 
have been, ex hypothesi-ao when a contingent 
thing is now a doing, it is at that time necessary 
that it should be, ex hypothesi; but it doth 
not therefore follow that it was necessarily 
caused
1 
or that it was impossible not to have 
been.4 
Quite evidently, Cudworth is here making extensive use 
of the Scholastic distinction between necessity of consequent 
and necessity of consequence. But his distinction is not 
as clear as that of Leibniz. 
As the passage above be~ testimony, Cudworth deploys 
the distinction between abs<>Jute and hypothetical necessity 
in his attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge and 
contingency. But unlike Ueibniz, Cudworth seems not to 
have had a fullyfledged theory of contingency; for, in his 
view, it is a sign of piety "to believe that God foreknows 
all future contingent events, though we cannot understand 
the manner how this should be".4 Whereas Leibniz defines 
contingency both in terms of the principle of contradiction 
and it terms of the distinction between the devine .will and 
divine intellect. So much for . Cudworth's criticisms of 
necessitarianism. It is to his views on the Molinistic 
conception of liberty we now turn. 
Epeleustic Freed.am and Ll"berum Arbitrium 
Molina claims that free coice consists in not only being 
free from necessity, but also from any causal intellectual 
antecedents. Man is said to be free if and only if, given 
several alternate courses of action, he chooses to execute 
one or any other without any reason whatsoever. Freedom, 
therefore, is an indifference of equipoise, a choice without 
preference. 45 
Cudworth found this position "monstro~ and prQCligioua•.46 
According to him; it fails tO recognise the difference· between 
corporeal and incorporeal substances. co:rP.oreu 8\1.bstances 
have no power of action; they are not sell-conscious. But 
_incorporeal substances,. says. Cw:i.wanh, act upon themlel"e' 
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as well as on corporeal substances; they are agents of thought; 
and are both agents and patients of actions.47 
With this metaphysical distinction, Cudworth goes on 
to distinguish between what, he claims, the Greeks called 
epeleustic48 liberty and libenun arbitrium. Corporeal 
substances have epeleustic liberty because it is possible 
for them to maintain an indifference of equipoise, just as 
two equal, but opposite, forces exerted on an object result 
into that object remaining stationary. But incorporeal 
substances, according to Cudworth, have a libenun arbitrium 
which is the foundation for commendation, blame or 
punishment. The fundamental difference, however, between 
epeleustic liberty and liberum arbitsi.um is not so much that 
they are executed by different types of substances. Liberty 
is epeleustic, in Cudworth's view, when the1·e is perfect 
equality in the objects of choice or courses of action. And 
in that case, the question of praise or bla~e does not arise 
since all the alternatives are equally attractive. 
For when two objects, perfectly equal and 
exactly alike, are propounded to a man's choice, 
as two eggs, or two guineas, or two golden 
balls, of equal bigness, and weight, and value, 
he cannot be justly blamed by any other or 
himself, for choosing one of them rather than 
another. And the case must be the same in 
all other objects of choice, that have a perfect 
equality of good in them, or are means equally 
tending and conducing to the same end. 49 
And although human beings could be said to have such 
epeleustic liberty, Cudworth denies that they can preserve 
an indifference of equipoise because "the same motives 
and reasons have not the same effect upon different men, 
nor yet upon thP- same man at different times.SO 
On the problem of Buridan's ass, Cudworth says much 
the same thing as Leibniz. Both argue that the hungry ass 
would not starve to death because it will no doubt go for 
one of the two heaps of hay.51 But Leibniz goes much further 
than Cudworth; he makes use of his principle of sufficient 
reason. "There will therefore always be many things in 
the ass and outside the ass", writes Leibniz, "although they 
may not be apparent to us, which will determine him to 
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go one side rather than the other.52 Leibniz in effect denies 
epeleustic liberty in human beings. 
The Principle of the Best 
Cudworth and Leibniz, however, held diametrically opposed 
positions on some fundamental points: (a) on the question 
of whether or not God created the best of all possible worlds; 
and (b) on the intelligibility of the notions of the will and 
the intellect. On (a) Cudworth is inconsistent, and on (b) 
his views are a reiteration of Francisco Suarez. F01• according 
to Suarez, there is no distinction between the will and the 
intellect since there is none between the potency and the 
act.53 
On the question of the best of all possible worlds, some 
passages in A Treatise of Freewill suggest that Cudworth 
held the view that this is the best of all possible worlds. 
For instance he writes: 
There is a nature of goodness, and a nature 
of wisdom antecedent to the will of God, which 
is the rule and measure of it (i.e. divine 
liberty) ••• 
All will is generally acknowledged to have 
this naturally or necessarily belonging to it, 
to be determined in good, as its object.54 
And since in God· inheres maximum perfection, which is 
beyond human comprehension, he is held to "will the best, 
and consequently make the world in the best manner".5!> 
But then at some point Cudworth seems to maintain, 
paradoxically, that divine decrees are arbitrary,56 not 
succoured by the principle ·of the best: "God would not be 
God, if he did not arbitrarily determine all things".57 That 
the world, he eventually brought into existence, 
should be just of such bigness, and not a jot 
less or bigger, is by the arbitrary appointment 
of God, since no man can with reason affirm 
that it was absolutely the best that it should 
not so much as an inch or hair's-breadth bigger 
or lesser than it is. 58 
That God operates under the principle of the best is, in 
Cudworth's view, a kind of fatalism. In fact, he argues against 
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it in his True Intellectual System of the Universe; it is, he 
says, a mathematical or astrological fatalism which the 
Stoics defended.59 Remarking on the Stoical position, 
Cudworth writers: 
that did also in some sense make God himself 
as servant to the necessity of the matter, 
and to his own decrees, in that he could not 
have made the smallest thing in the world 
otherwise than now it is, much less was able 
to alter anything: according to that of Seneca: ••• 
'One and the same chain of necessity ties God 
and men. The same irrevocable and unalterable 
course carries on divine and human things. 
The very maker and governor of all things, 
that writ the fates, follows them. He did 
but once command, but he always obeys•.60 
And these remarks of the Stoical fatalists were, according 
to Cudworth, 'confused and contradictous jumble of words1.6I 
And thus it comes as no surprise that Cudworth insists on 
preserving divine liberty that is not under the yoke of any 
principle. 
Intellect and Will 
But on the will and the intellect, Cudworth maintains that 
it is absolute nonsense to talk of the will as distinct from 
the intellect. And, in his opinion, Scholastic philosophy, 
in which this distinction is observed, is 'manifestedly absurd' 
because 
to attribute the act of intellection and percep-
tion to the faculty of understanding, and acts 
of volition to the faculty of will, or to say 
that it is the understanding that unerstandeth, 
and the will that willeth ••• is all one as should 
say that the faculty of walkin~ walketh, and 
the faculty of speaking speaketh. 
In obliterating the distinction between the will and the 
intellect, Cudworth hoped he would avoid difficulties attending 
those positions in which the distinction is preserved. One 
such difficulty is that of what precedes what with regard 
to the will and the intellect. Thus the will and the intellect 
are, in Cudworth's view, two activities of one and the same 
substance. For he continues to write: 
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But all this while it is really the man or the 
soul that understands, and the man or the 
soul that wills, as it is the man that walks, 
and the man that speaks or talks ••• it is one 
and the same subsistent thing, one and the 
same soul that UJ1.derstandeth and willeth, 
and the same agent only that acteth diversely. 
And thu8 may it well be conceived that one 
and the same reasonable soul in us may both 
will understandingly or knowingly of what 
it wills; and understand or think of this and 
that object willingly.63 
Cudworth's argument against distinguishing the will from 
the intellect does not hold. In fact, the analogy he uses 
supports the distinction between the intellect and the will. 
To say, as Cudworth does, that a person 'understands willingly' 
is to presuppose that the act of willing precedes that of 
understanding. On the other hand, to say that the person 
'wills understandingly' is nothing less than asserting that 
the intellect precedes the will. Thus Cudworth does not 
at all succeed in resolving the distinction between the intellect 
and the will. 
However, if it is felt that Cudworth leaves the problem 
of freedom and necessity unresolved, that he leaves us where 
we started, he himself also thought so. He points out that 
if what I shall say concerning freewill seems 
unsatisfactory to any, I shall think it no marvel 
at all, for I never was my:self satisfied in any 
discourse which I read of it.64 
But in making this remark, Cudworth was merely being 
modest, for his criticisms of necessitarianism and of the 
Molinistic conception of freedom are significant despite 
the shortcomings in his philosophy. 
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